Multi-Agent Sandbox & Tools
Per-agent sandbox + tool restrictions, precedence, and examples
Each agent in a multi-agent setup can now have its own:
- ''Sandbox configuration'' (''agents.list[].sandbox'' overrides ''agents.defaults.sandbox'')
- ''Tool restrictions'' (''tools.allow'' / ''tools.deny'', plus ''agents.list[].tools'')
This allows you to run multiple agents with different security profiles:
- Personal assistant with full access
- Family/work agents with restricted tools
- Public-facing agents in sandboxes
~/.openclaw/agents/<agentId>/agent/auth-profiles.json
''setupCommand'' belongs under ''sandbox.docker'' (global or per-agent) and runs once when the container is created.
Auth is per-agent: each agent reads from its own ''agentDir'' auth store at:
Credentials are ''not'' shared between agents. Never reuse ''agentDir'' across agents. If you want to share creds, copy ''auth-profiles.json'' into the other agent's ''agentDir''.
Configuration Examples
Example 1: Personal + Restricted Family Agent
{
"agents": {
"list": [
{
"id": "main",
"default": true,
"name": "Personal Assistant",
"workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace",
"sandbox": { "mode": "off" }
},
{
"id": "family",
"name": "Family Bot",
"workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-family",
"sandbox": {
"mode": "all",
"scope": "agent"
},
"tools": {
"allow": ["read"],
"deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch", "process", "browser"]
}
}
]
},
"bindings": [
{
"agentId": "family",
"match": {
"provider": "whatsapp",
"accountId": "*",
"peer": {
"kind": "group",
"id": "[email protected]"
}
}
}
]
}Result:
- ''main'' agent: Runs on host, full tool access
- ''family'' agent: Runs in Docker (one container per agent), only ''read'' tool
Example 2: Work Agent with Shared Sandbox
{
"agents": {
"list": [
{
"id": "personal",
"workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-personal",
"sandbox": { "mode": "off" }
},
{
"id": "work",
"workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-work",
"sandbox": {
"mode": "all",
"scope": "shared",
"workspaceRoot": "/tmp/work-sandboxes"
},
"tools": {
"allow": ["read", "write", "apply_patch", "exec"],
"deny": ["browser", "gateway", "discord"]
}
}
]
}
}Example 2b: Global coding profile + messaging-only agent
{
"tools": { "profile": "coding" },
"agents": {
"list": [
{
"id": "support",
"tools": { "profile": "messaging", "allow": ["slack"] }
}
]
}
}Result:
- default agents get coding tools
- ''support'' agent is messaging-only (+ Slack tool)
{
"agents": {
"defaults": {
"sandbox": {
"mode": "non-main", // Global default
"scope": "session"
}
},
"list": [
{
"id": "main",
"workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace",
"sandbox": {
"mode": "off" // Override: main never sandboxed
}
},
{
"id": "public",
"workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-public",
"sandbox": {
"mode": "all", // Override: public always sandboxed
"scope": "agent"
},
"tools": {
"allow": ["read"],
"deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch"]
}
}
]
}
}Configuration Precedence
When both global (''agents.defaults.*'') and agent-specific (''agents.list[].*'') configs exist:
Sandbox Config
Agent-specific settings override global:
agents.list[].sandbox.mode > agents.defaults.sandbox.mode agents.list[].sandbox.scope > agents.defaults.sandbox.scope agents.list[].sandbox.workspaceRoot > agents.defaults.sandbox.workspaceRoot agents.list[].sandbox.workspaceAccess > agents.defaults.sandbox.workspaceAccess agents.list[].sandbox.docker.* > agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.* agents.list[].sandbox.browser.* > agents.defaults.sandbox.browser.* agents.list[].sandbox.prune.* > agents.defaults.sandbox.prune.*
Notes:
- agents.list[].sandbox.{docker,browser,prune}.* overrides agents.defaults.sandbox.{docker,browser,prune}.* for that agent (ignored when sandbox scope resolves to "shared").
Tool Restrictions
The filtering order is as follows:
1. ''Tool profile'' (''tools.profile'' or ''agents.list[].tools.profile'')
2. ''Provider tool profile'' (''tools.byProvider[provider].profile'' or ''agents.list[].tools.byProvider[provider].profile'')
3. ''Global tool policy'' (''tools.allow'' / ''tools.deny'')
4. ''Provider tool policy'' (''tools.byProvider[provider].allow/deny'')
5. ''Agent-specific tool policy'' (''agents.list[].tools.allow/deny'')
6. ''Agent provider policy'' (''agents.list[].tools.byProvider[provider].allow/deny'')
7. ''Sandbox tool policy'' (''tools.sandbox.tools'' or ''agents.list[].tools.sandbox.tools'')
8. ''Subagent tool policy'' (''tools.subagents.tools'', if applicable)
Each level can further restrict tools, but cannot grant back denied tools from earlier levels.
If ''agents.list[].tools.sandbox.tools'' is set, it replaces ''tools.sandbox.tools'' for that agent.
If ''agents.list[].tools.profile'' is set, it overrides ''tools.profile'' for that agent.
Provider tool keys accept either ''provider'' (e.g. ''google-antigravity'') or ''provider/model'' (e.g. ''openai/gpt-5.2'').
Tool groups (shorthands)
Tool policies (global, agent, sandbox) support ''group:*'' entries that expand to multiple concrete tools:
- ''group:runtime'': ''exec'', ''bash'', ''process''
- ''group:fs'': ''read'', ''write'', ''edit'', ''apply_patch''
- ''group:sessions'': ''sessions_list'', ''sessions_history'', ''sessions_send'', ''sessions_spawn'', ''session_status''
- ''group:memory'': ''memory_search'', ''memory_get''
- ''group:ui'': ''browser'', ''canvas''
- ''group:automation'': ''cron'', ''gateway''
- ''group:messaging'': ''message''
- ''group:nodes'': ''nodes''
- ''group:openclaw'': all built-in OpenClaw tools (excludes provider plugins)
Elevated Mode
''tools.elevated'' is the global baseline (sender-based allowlist). ''agents.list[].tools.elevated'' can further restrict elevated for specific agents (both must allow).
Mitigation patterns:
- Deny ''exec'' for untrusted agents (''agents.list[].tools.deny: ["exec"]'')
- Avoid allowlisting senders that route to restricted agents
- Disable elevated globally (''tools.elevated.enabled: false'') if you only want sandboxed execution
- Disable elevated per agent (''agents.list[].tools.elevated.enabled: false'') for sensitive profiles
- Deny `exec` for untrusted agents (`agents.list[].tools.deny: ["exec"]`)
- Avoid allowlisting senders that route to restricted agents
- Disable elevated globally (`tools.elevated.enabled: false`) if you only want sandboxed execution
- Disable elevated per agent (`agents.list[].tools.elevated.enabled: false`) for sensitive profiles
- Deny `exec` for untrusted agents (`agents.list[].tools.deny: ["exec"]`)
- Avoid allowlisting senders that route to restricted agents
- Disable elevated globally (`tools.elevated.enabled: false`) if you only want sandboxed execution
- Disable elevated per agent (`agents.list[].tools.elevated.enabled: false`) for sensitive profiles
- Deny `exec` for untrusted agents (`agents.list[].tools.deny: ["exec"]`)
- Avoid allowlisting senders that route to restricted agents
- Disable elevated globally (`tools.elevated.enabled: false`) if you only want sandboxed execution
Tool Restriction Examples
Read-only Agent
{
"tools": {
"allow": ["read"],
"deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch", "process"]
}
}Safe Execution Agent (no file modifications)
{
"tools": {
"allow": ["read", "exec", "process"],
"deny": ["write", "edit", "apply_patch", "browser", "gateway"]
}
}Communication-only Agent
{
"tools": {
"allow": ["sessions_list", "sessions_send", "sessions_history", "session_status"],
"deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch", "read", "browser"]
}
}Common Pitfall: "non-main"
''agents.defaults.sandbox.mode: "non-main"'' is based on ''session.mainKey'' (default ''"main"''), not the agent id. Group/channel sessions always get their own keys, so they are treated as non-main and will be sandboxed. If you want an agent to never sandbox, set ''agents.list[].sandbox.mode: "off"''.
Testing
After configuring multi-agent sandbox and tools:
openclaw agents list --bindings
1. Check agent resolution:
docker ps --filter "name=openclaw-sbx-"
2. Verify sandbox containers:
3. Test tool restrictions:
- Send a message requiring restricted tools
- Verify the agent cannot use denied tools
tail -f "${OPENCLAW_STATE_DIR:-$HOME/.openclaw}/logs/gateway.log" | grep -E "routing|sandbox|tools"